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International  markets  for  the  majority  of  subsidies to promote exports or tariffs and
agricultural commodities are extremely com-  quotas to  restrict trade; they  can curtail
plex. They include public and private traders  production by the use of acreage controls
along with influences  from  domestic and  in-  or increase it  by price supports; they  can
ternational  government  policies.  In  recent  also influence price by direct involvement
years,  the  United  States  has  experienced  a  in  the price negotiations between exporters
decline  in  the  market  share  in  two  of  its  and importers (that is,  by state trading)"
major agricultural  exports-rice  and wheat.  (Schmitz et al., p. 23). However,  in addition,
For  example,  at  one  time  the  United  States  the private  trade  is  a  key  player  along with
had roughly  45 percent  of the world wheat  government  marketing  boards.  To  illustrate
market;  but,  by  the  end  of  1985,  its  share  a  contrast,  the  Canadian  Wheat  Board  is  a
had dropped below 40 percent. Also, in terms  producer marketing board and the sole seller
of rice,  the  United  States  market  share  has  of Canadian wheat for the export market;  its
dropped  from  25  percent  to below  20 per-  sales  to  the  Soviet  Union  are  examples  of
cent.  state trading. In the United States,  a few major
The question  arises  as to whether  the loss  private  grain  companies  export  the  largest
in the  market  share has anything to do with  portion of United States  grain. A sale  by one
marketing institutions or whether this market  of these  private  firms  to  the  Soviet  Union
share  decline  has  more  to  do with  govern-  would be viewed as a private-to-government
ment  policy and  agricultural productivity.  I  sale. In the United States, while cooperatives
will compare  and contrast  the United  States  play a major role at the farm-collection level,
competitive  position in both import  and ex-  they influence  less than  20 percent of wheat
port markets.  I  first  compare  the wheat  and  exports.  Once  wheat  leaves  the  country  el-
rice markets where clearly southern  agricul-  evator,  the  majority  of  the  wheat  becomes
ture has  a  major stake. A major difference  in  the  product  of multinational  grain  compa-
these  markets  is that a  lively futures market  nies
exists for wheat, while  such is absent  in the  The  degree  to  which  governments  and
rice  trade.  An  analysis  of the  cotton  market  boards  are  involed  in international  pricing
is  also  presented.  Then,  certain  imported  of grains has been changing. Canada and Aus-
commodities which are of crucial importance  tralia  have  been  state  traders  since  the  in-
to southern agriculture are discussed.  I make  trae  a  a  state  trader
brief comments on sugar and the importation  terwar  period;  Argentina  was  a  state  trader
of fresh winter vegetables.  Sugar  is clearly a  until  the  mid-1970s  but  now  relies  on  the
concern for Texas and Louisiana, while  fresh  private  trade;  and the United  States,  the  Eu-
winter  vegetables  are  of major  concern  to  ropean Community  (EC),  and Thailand  rly
Florida.  on private  traders.  Thus, on the export side,
the growing  dominance  of the United States
means  that the volume  of grain  trade  origi-
Wheat  nating  in state-trading  nations  has declined.
On the import side, the opposite is occurring.
Government  policies  influence  the wheat  Traditional  markets in Western Europe, which
trade  in  many  ways.  "They  can use export  relied on private traders. have declined, while
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41the importance of the centrally planned econ-  Many  people  have  questioned  why  farm
omies  to  the  developing  countries  has  in-  cooperatives  have not played  a  more  signif-
creased.  McCalla  and  Schmitz  (1979a)  icant role  in  the exporting  of United  States
estimated  that the  proportion  of wheat  that  grain  and why they turn much of their busi-
involves  only  private  traders  is  small  and  ness over to the private sector. The following
declining,  involving  only  5  percent  of the  reasons  are given:  (1)  lack  of access  to co-
trade  during  1973-1977.  The  reciprocal,  of  operative  export  facilities,  (2)  less  risk  in
course,  is that 95 percent of the world trade  indirect  sales,  (3)  better  price,  (4)  econ-
in wheat  involves  a  state  trader  on  at  least  omies of size,  (5)  lack of expertise,  (6)  un-
one  side  of  the  transaction.  Second,  state  willingness to coordinate,  and (7)  fear of the
trader-to-state  trader transactions account for  unknown. The  main differences  between  co-
about  one-third  of  the  trade  and  this  per-  operatives making direct export sales and the
centage  seems  to  be  fairly  stable  through  private  trade  are  the  cooperatives  lack  of:
time.  (1)  a  market  intelligence  system,  (2)  div-
In  spite  of increased  involvement  in the  ersification,  (3)  multiple  grain  sources,  (4)
pricing  of wheat  by  governments  and  mar-  flexibility,  (5)  overseas  facilities  and  sales
keting  boards,  the  private  grain  trade  still  offices,  and  (6)  secrecy  of operations.  For
plays  a  major role  in the marketing  of both  example,  lack  of diversification  of coopera-
wheat  and  feed  grains,  even  for  countries  tives  means that they cannot spread the risks
where  state  agencies  dominate.  The  private  inherent in the exporting  business.
grain firms, which are multinational in scope,  Studies have been made in the international
carry  out  several  functions  crucial  to  the  wheat market to determine the extent of mar-
marketing  of grain.  For  example,  in  Canada  ket  power  by  exporters  and  importers.
the private  trade  is involved  since  it carries  McCalla  has  argued  that  the  market  is  oli-
out  shipping  and  other  activities  related  to  gopolistic  and that Canada  is  a price leader.
getting  the grain  from  Canada  to  importers.  Later,  Alaouze  et  al.  postulated  a  triopoly
As  McCalla  and Schmitz  (1979b)  point out,  model of the world wheat market with  Can-
the private grain traders act as agents to wheat  ada  as  a  revenue-maximizing  price  leader.
boards in both Canada and Australia.  In some  However,  Carter  and  Schmitz 'argue  that,  if
cases,  they  merely  carry  out the  marketing  anyone has market power,  it is the importer.
transactions  after the board  has negotiated  a  They  contend  that  importers  follow  an  op-
price with  an importer.  In other cases,  they  timal tariff strategy in that they impose tariffs
will make outright purchases from the board  which,  in essence, make importers better off
and resell  this  grain to  importers.  than under free trade. They demonstrate this
Generally,  state  traders  never  become  in-  for the period prior to 1979 and clearly show
volved  directly in the  logistical  terms of the  the optimal tariff case  for countries,  such  as
grain-handling  system.  The  Canadian  Wheat  Japan,  and  in  the  European  Community.  If
Board,  for  example,  sells  principally  on  an  nations  follow  an  optimal  import  strategy
f.o.b. basis leaving the importer to deal with  through  optimal  tariffs,  they  are  in essence,
the risks involving shipping, freight,  and for-  setting  prices in the world market by behav-
eign  exchange.  Similarly,  state  trading  im-  ing  as  monopsony  buyers  in  international
porters  typically buy on cost plus insurance  trade. If this theory is correct, exporters must
and  freight  basis.  This  means  that,  in  con-  seriously  consider the  extent to which they
tractual  arrangements  involving  a state  trad-  have been losing out on world trade because
ing  exporter  and a  state  trading importer,  a  of the  lack of market  power.
middleman  (usually  a  multinational  grain  A striking difference between multinational
firm)  is  almost  always  involved  in  at  least  grain  firms  and  producer  marketing  boards
the  logistics  of the  trade.  Second,  a  private  in  a  given  country  is that  a  given  multina-
trader  buying  grain  from  a  state  trading  ex-  tional  grain  company,  unlike  a  marketing
porter,  without  a prior  sales  contract,  has  a  board,  buys  grain  from  many  countries  and
large range of contractual variables on which  sells  grain to many countries.  This  gives the
to negotiate with importers,  private or state.  multinational  grain  companies  an advantage
Thus, in these  cases,  considerable  scope  for  over  marketing  boards  in  the  marketing  of
price variation exists. In addition, the private  grain since they have access to many sources
sector is also heavily involved in carrying out  of supply to meet export commitments.  This
the  merchandising  activity for United  States  raises  the  question  of producer  welfare  at
government  sales under  P.L.  480.  any point in time since, when the large com-
42panies  shop  around  for  the  best  deal  for  It is generally held that the reason the United
themselves,  their  actions  do  not necessarily  States  market  share  is  falling  is  due  to  a
always benefit the producers  in a country  in  government  loan rate  which is  set too  high.
which  the parent  company  is  located.  Clearly,  the  1985  Farm Bill  has lowered the
There  is an active futures  market in wheat  loan rate; therefore, if this has been the major
and  it  is  used  extensively  by  private  grain  factor determining market share in the world
companies.  It  is  used  to  a  lesser  extent  by  grain trade,  the market share in the next year
state  traders  on  the  importing  side  and  is  or two  should  increase  substantially.
rarely used directly  by  marketing  boards  in
exporting  countries  although, recently,  Aus-  RICE
tralia  increased  its  involvement  in  United
States  wheat  futures.  However,  Canada  still  and  The  export  sdoubled b  etwee
uses  the  futures  market  indirectly.  For  ex-  mart is  d  The  export side  of the rice
ample,  the  transactions  it  carries  out  with  market is dominated byafew Asiancountries
the  private  trade  are  generally  hedged  on  and the  United States while the import side
United States  futures  markets.  is more dispersed geographically.  The United
Information  is  gathered  from  all  sources  States  and Thailand  are  the two  largest rice
and is revealed in futures market prices which  exporters, accounting for roughly 50 percent
are  available  to  exporters,  importers,  pro-  of the  trade  since  1980.  Because  of strong
ducers,  and  the like.  In  a  sense,  one  could  tastes and  preferences,  there  is  limited sub-
argue  that the  futures  market  is the  central  stitution between  the various types  of rice.
pricing  point in the international  grain  mar-  On  an  international  basis,  price  data  are
ket.  In a recent paper,  Caves argued that the  not available  by type of rice.  The  most com-
existence of the active futures market assures  monly used world  price  is the  Thailand  ex-
that  the  private  grain  trade  is  highly  com-  portpriceformilledrice,  100percentsecond
petitive.  Whether  or  not this  is  the  case  is  grade  (Grade  B,  f.o.b.  mill,  Bangkok).  Ac-
not debated here. What is more open to ques-  cording to Slayton,  the Bangkok  f.o.b. price
tion  is  the  extent  to which futures  markets  is not truly representative  of the actual trad-
give such trading nations as the Soviet Union,  ing  price.  It  is  sometimes  as  much  as  10
an advantage  over  exporters.  Clearly,  coun-  percent above  the transaction price.  Govern-
tries such as China and the Soviet Union have  ment  involvement  in the  international  rice
excellent  information  about  the  grain  mar-  trade  has  been  extensive.  In  1983,  govern-
kets through  futures markets  activities  since  ments  were  active  in  60  percent  of  total
prices  on  these  markets  are  quoted  daily.  imports and 46 percent of total exports (Slay-
However, major exporters, such as the United  ton).  Only  in  the  United  States,  Australia,
States, do not have  a great deal of information  Italy, Argentina,  Uruguay,  and  Spain  are  ex-
on the  Soviet Union other than  through  sat-  ports left to the  private  trade.  Government-
ellites,  cooperative  agreements,  etc.  Thus,  to-government contracts are used extensively
one could argue that the information  gained  as  trade  instruments.  More  than  43  percent
through  futures markets  is  asymmetric.  of  rice  exports  by  Thailand,  Pakistan,  and
In the wheat trade,  one might wonder the  Burma in 1983 were via these arrangements.
extent to which the private trade deals mostly  The  rice  market  can  be  characterized  as
with private importers and the extent to which  thin,  volatile,  and risky.  The  lack of widely
state  traders  deal  with  state  traders.  In  the  quoted actual  trading price data adds to the
Canadian  case,  more  and  more  of their  ex-  trading risk. There is no common price quoted
ports  are  going  to  Communist  countries.  by type or quality of rice in the international
Therefore,  in  this  case,  state  traders  are  in-  market  nor is there  a  commonly  used grade
creasing  their  involvement  with  other  state  standard.  There  is  no world-recognized  cen-
traders.  However,  it may well be that private  tral  futures  market  for  rice.  Thus,  without
traders find those types of markets where  the  the existence  of any effective  futures market,
private  trade  on  the  importing  side  is  very  the trading risk is increased since  traders are
active,  exposed  to large profits or losses when there
The United States has been losing its market  is no hedging  (Stucker).  In addition, the rice
share in the world wheat  market  during  the  market  is  one  where  transaction  costs  are
1980s.  People  have  contended  that  this  is  frequently high because of the need to search
essentially  due  to United  States  farm  policy  for supply sources  (Siamwalla  and  Haykin).
and has nothing  to do with  grain  marketing.  This  search  may  entail  costs  to  private
43traders-for example, brokerage fees or time-  political  arrangements  are  also  clearly  cor-
lost cost to governments.  In spite  of the sig-  related with the degree of state trading among
nificance  of state  trading,  the  international  nations.
rice markets  support a  number  of brokerage  How  efficient  is  the  world  rice  market?
houses  in the United States,  Singapore,  Hong  There is no easy answer. Clearly,  information
Kong,  and Europe.  Brokerage  fees of 5  to 10  is  a  key  to  efficient  marketing  (Sarris  and
percent  are  not uncommon.  These  rates  are  Schmitz,).  Because  of economies  of scale  in
significantly  higher  for  rice  than  for  wheat  information gathering and the absence of rice
presumably  because  of  higher  search  costs  futures markets,  it is hypothesized that wide
(Rastegari-Henneberry).  and volatile marketing margins exist for large
The  United  States  world  market  shares  rice  trading firms.
dropped  from  about one-fourth  of the  total
in 1980 to 16 percent in 1984 and 18 percent  COTTON
in  1985 while  that of Thailand rose from  21
percent in 1980 to 34 percent in 1985, partly  The Southern United States is a major world
because  Thailand  exporters  were  selling  at  exporter of cotton (U.  S. Foreign Agricultural
$170 to $200 per metric ton below the United  Service;  U. S.  Department  of Agriculture).
States  price  (30  to 40 percent  of the United  Among  the  major  producers  are  California
States  price). A strong dollar and a  high loan  and Texas. The marketing of cotton has many
rate  for the  United  States  have  reduced  the  of the  same  elements  present  in  the  inter-
competitiveness  of United  States  exports  in  national wheat market.  Cooperatives  are  en-
international  markets.  Meanwhile,  devalua-  gaged  in  the  marketing  of  cotton
tion of Thailand currency and a reduction of  internationally along with private traders. For
controls over exports, especially export taxes,  example,  Calcott  is a  major exporter of Cal-
have made  Thailand  exports more  attractive  ifornia  and Arizona  cotton  and  is  a  cooper-
in foreign  markets.  ative. It markets roughly one-half of the cotton
In  the  United  States,  rice  exports  under  grown in Arizona and California.  Some of the
government programs (P.L. 480) have played  major private  players  in the  market  also are
a significant  role in promoting United  States  those in the grain trade. These include Bunge,
rice exports (Stucker),  but exports under P.L.  Cargill, and Continental Grain-Cargill  mar-
480,  as  a  percentage  of total  United  States  kets  through  a  subsidiary  called  Ralli  and
exports,  declined  in  1976  and  1982  from  Continental  markets through  Conticotton  in
over  44  percent  to  less  than  12  percent.  Fresno,  California.  The  industry  consists  of
Although  this  market  share  is  recovering  many growers.  Cotton  from  growers  is han-
somewhat,  its  role  has  not  been  as  signifi-  died by shippers,  ginners,  brokers,  commis-
cantly as it was  during the late  1970s.  Thus,  sioned buyers,  CCC  loans,  and cooperatives
government  involvement  has significantly  af-  that,  in  turn,  then  deal  with foreign  mills.
fected  the  United  States  rice  market  share.  Cotton  not  placed  under  loan  at  harvest  is
Also,  political  factors  have  influenced  the  usually sold to one of the following types  of
market  share where governments  on a state-  firms:
to-state  trading  basis  are  more  reluctant  to  (1)  merchant  shippers  who  perform  all
trade with certain countries than with others.  functions  involved  in moving  cotton
There  has been a major shift in importers'  from the producer to the foreign mill.
sources  of supply,  especially  in  developing  (2)  cooperative  marketing  associations
countries  which  constitute  about  70  to  75  which  act  as  shippers  and  represent
percent  of world  rice  imports.  African  and  producer members  of the association
Middle Eastern countries have increased their  and distribute  any  profits  to produc-
import share as  a percentage  of world trade,  ers.
while  Asian  countries  (South  Korea  and  In-  (3)  brokers or commissioned  buyers who
donesia,  in particular)  have decreased  theirs  purchase  cotton  in  country  markets
since the  1970s. In  the Middle Eastern  mar-  from producers or  ginners  and sell  it
kets,  United  States  exports  to Iran and  Syria  to  domestic  mills  on  behalf  of  mer-
have  also  decreased  as Thailand  exports  in-  chant shippers or large producers, and
creased.  These  markets,  clearly  affected  by  (4)  gin buyers who are usually gin owners
not only economic  but also political  forces,  supplementing their income by acting
have played.a role in the decline of the United  as a merchant shipper in that they take
States  market  share.  Political  influence  and  title to the  cotton.
44There  is an active futures market  in cotton  grew  substantially  in  the  1970s  but  lost
in which  many  foreign  buyers,  e.g.,  Japan,  ground  in  the  1984-85  period.  Thus,  the
hedge. In addition, the trade carries out hedg-  United  States  is  losing  its  market  share  in
ing activities on the cotton futures exchange.  cotton just as it has its wheat and other com-
In the  total  market,  merchant  shippers  and  modities  described in this paper.
the  cooperative  marketing associations  han-  There  are  many  United  States  and  inter-
dle  the  greatest  part  of each  year's  cotton  national cotton organizations which facilitate
crop both for domestic use and export. They  the trade.  These include the National Cotton
handle  approximately  three-fourths  of  all  Council;  the  Cotton  Council  International;
United  States cotton marketings.  Most United  The  American  Cotton  Marketing  Coopera-
States cotton exporters are members of either  tives; Cotton, Inc.; the International Institute
the American  Cotton Shippers Association  or  for  Cotton;  and  the  Committee  for Interna-
the American Cotton Marketing Cooperatives.  tional  Cooperation  Between  Cotton  Associ-
There  are  also  active  spot  cotton  markets  ations.
located  in  such  areas  as  Montgomery,  Ala-  In terms of United States export programs,
bama;  Phoenix,  Arizona;  Augusta,  Georgia;  P.L.  480  plays  a  major  role.  Under  Title  1,
and Fresno,  California.  the United States is authorized to sell cotton,
With futures  and hedging  by importers,  it  cotton  yarn,  and unfinished  fabric  manufac-
is hypothesized that the size of stockholding  tured  entirely from  United  States  cotton  on
is affected  as is its distribution. The exporter  long-term  credits.  Because  cotton  is  sold to
generally  ends  up  holding  the  stocks.  The  many of the Communist countries around the
importer  needs to hold  only minimal  stocks  world, much of the trade  involves state trad-
since such  firms  can avoid  risks  by hedging  ing at least  on one side of the market  trans-
on United  States  futures  markets.  action.  This follows since countries, such  as
Interestingly,  the  export  cotton  market  is  China,  essentially  have  government  buyers
such that  not  all  sellers  sell  in  all  markets.  who are in charge  of buying the commodity
Not every cotton  exporter tries  to sell  in all  and carrying out the import activities.  How-
export  markets  or  offers  all  of the  varieties  ever, countries  in Western Europe rely heav-
produced  in the United States.  It is difficult  ily  on  the  private  trade  to  carry  out
and  expensive  to serve  efficiently  all  of the  transactions. It is hypothesized that state trad-
50 or more foreign countries that buy United  ing agencies  do a larger volume  of business
States cotton. Some exporters, therefore,  con-  with United States  cotton  cooperatives  than
centrate on certain foreign countries and oth-  do  private  buying  agencies  in  importing
ers specialize in particular specialized market  countries.  As  with  wheat  and  rice,  we  hy-
areas. Thus, one can think of marketing zones  pothesize that private companies have a tend-
within the international cotton market where  ency  to  do  business  with  other  private
certain traders operate  in specific  zones  and  companies and that state traders have  a tend-
do not cross over into the several  other mar-  ency to do business with other state trading
keting zones that  exist.  agencies.  Therefore,  one could test whether
Cotton  is  similar  to wheat  in  that  an  ex-  or  not this  type  of transaction,  itself,  leads
porter can either be a buying or selling agency  to certain buying patterns and marketing rings
and can make  a commission strictly on sales.  in the international  cotton  market.
For example, a cooperative  could make  a sale
to a major importer and have the private trade
essentially  carry out the marketing  activities  WINTER  VEGETABLES
after the cotton  leaves  the farm gate.  This is  There  is a  significant trade  of fresh winter
sometimes referred  to as  the  merchandising  vegetables  between  the  United  States  and
part of the trade. Also, at times, a cooperative  Mexico.  The  major  southern  producer  par-
sells cotton directly to the private trade where  ticipant  on the United States  side  is  Florida.
the private trade then negotiates,  in addition  Historically,  Florida producers,  through  the
to merchandising,  the final price for the cot-  courts, have brought dumping charges against
ton.  Mexico  in  the fresh winter  vegetable  trade.
In recent years, the  10 largest markets  for  The United States Departments of Commerce
United States cotton have been Canada, China,  and  the  Treasury,  in  their  initial  investiga-
Hong  Kong,  Indonesia,  Italy,  Japan,  Korea,  tions, ruled that dumping as perceived under
the  Philippines,  Taiwan,  and Thailand.  The  United  States  law  was  not  occurring  (the
United  States'  market  share in world  cotton  1978 Dumping Investigation).  In the appeal,
45Florida  argued  that  dumping  was  occurring  in  which,  perhaps,  distortions  are  greater
in that Mexican  producers  were  selling veg-  than  in  any other  commodity.  At the  end of
etables below the cost of production.  In the  1985,  United  States  producer  prices  were
final  analysis,  the  United  States  government  roughly three-and-one-half times greater than
ruled that dumping was not occurring; there-  world  market  sugar  prices.  This  is,  in  large
fore,  essentially,  fresh winter vegetables  are  part, because  sugar  producers  in the United
allowed to move into the United States market  States  are  highly  protected  through  quotas.
duty free  (Schmitz et al.). This example pro-  In addition,  a larger percentage  of the sugar
vides  an  interesting  case  where  marketing  trade  involves  state-to-state  traders  and,  in
institutions  may well  have  played  and  con-  certain  cases,  trade  is  blocked for  political
tinue to play  a major  role.  reasons. Cuba,  for example,  is considered  to
At  Nogales,  many  brokers  exist  who,  in  be  one  of the  world's  most  efficient  sugar
essence,  represent  or  buy  from  vegetable  producers;  yet, it cannot export sugar to the
growers  and sell to  United  States  and Cana-  United States market  (Bates and Schmitz).  In
dian buyers.  The structure  of this wholesale  addition, although Cuba sells sugar to certain
market  at Nogales  is somewhat  unknown  in  countries at the free-market or residual world
that there  are many  intermediaries  that rep-  price,  it  sells  sugar  to  its  ally,  the  Soviet
resent different interests. However,  those bro-  Union, at much higher prices than the Soviet
kers who  do not represent  Mexican growers  Union  could  buy  sugar  elsewhere.  In  part,
certainly  have  it  in  their  interest  to  have  the  Soviet  Union  is  financing  activities  in
liberalized trade,  large volumes of shipments,  Cuba through its purchases  of sugar at prices
and price instability. Thus, to maximize prof-  well  above  what  Cuba  could  obtain  for  its
its  for  certain  wholesalers,  one  would  not  sugar  in other  destinations.
argue  for  United  States  tariffs  on  Mexican  There is an international  sugar futures mar-
vegetables,  nor  would  wholesalers  (except  ket  from  which  is  derived  some  notion  of
for  those  who  represent  Mexican  interests)  free-market  or  residual  prices.  Clearly,  the
want  to  pursue  cooperative  United  States-  United States users, such as Coca Cola, Pepsi
Mexican  growers'  strategies.  Such  coopera-  Cola,  and  Mars  chocolate,  cannot buy sugar
tive  strategies  include  voluntary quotas  and  at these prices since  the United States  quota
marketing  orders  where  economic  rents  to  provision requires that the price of imported
both  Florida  and Mexican  producers  can be  sugar roughly correspond to the United States
maximized through either one of these means  producer price  after certain  adjustments  are
(Bredahl  et al.).  Free  trade  is,  in essence,  a  made  for  transportation,  etc.  Therefore,  the
competitive  strategy where  the rents of Flor-  role  of  sugar  futures  trading  is  not  clear.
ida  producers  are lower  than they would be  While it does give some  indication  of either
had a cooperative  strategy been  pursued.  To  the  surplus  or  deficit  situation  of  sugar  in
pursue a cooperative strategy entails not only  residual  markets,  it  clearly  does  not  do  a
cooperation  among  Florida  producers  and  great  deal  (especially  in  a  surplus  market)
Mexican  producers  but,  in  addition,  inter-  to facilitate  the import/export  trade. For ex-
mediaries  who  carry  out the  trade.  It is  hy-  ample, when the world price is at least three
pothesized  that  the  type  of  intermediaries  times  below  the  United  States  price,  it  is
involved in international trade between Mex-  doubtful  whether  or  not  Coca  Cola  would
ico  and the  United  States  greatly  influences  hedge  on world sugar futures markets unless
the  type  of outcome  that  is  finally  realized  it  expected  free-market  prices  to  exceed
in  international trade  arrangements.  United States internal prices  (at times in his-
As with rice,  there are  no futures  markets  tory,  this  has  been  the  case).  However,  fu-
in  fresh vegetables  such  as  lettuce,  cucum-  tures,  especially  the  domestic  futures,  are
bers, etc. As a result, these are high-risk crops  used  by  companies  to  carry  out  the  mer-
with  imperfect  markets.  Growers  generally  chandising part of the trade.
cannot  hedge  their  crop  at  the  time  it  is  Sugar  represents  a  case  where  producers
planted.  are  highly  protected,  international  trade  is
highly distorted, and the efficient functioning
SUGAR  of  a  sugar  market  can  be  questioned.  After
The  efficient functioning  of the world and  state  trading  in sugar  is carried out plus ex-
United States markets has been a controversial  port  dumping  created  by  European  Com-
subject area for many years  (Leu et al.).  This  munity subsidies,  one is essentially  left with
is partly because it is an international market  a  residual or free market  in sugar where  the
46volume  has  to  be  less  than  one-third  of in-  ketplace  than  do  the  inefficiencies  created
ternational  trade  in  sugar  (Hoff  and  Law-  by  marketing  institutions.  That  is,  even  if
rence).  markets are inefficient, the impact is probably
Within the United States, there are also key  far  less  than  the  impact  that  governments
players  who  are  influential  in dictating  the  create.  For example, in the United States one
outcome  of the United States  farm programs  could  hypothesize  that  multinational  grain
for  sugar  and,  hence,  its  marketing.  In  the  companies prefer an open high volume, highly
1985  Farm  Bill,  the sugar  policy was  essen-  unstable market since they are in the business
tially unchanged  from what it  had been  his-  of buying and selling commodities; the return
torically.  Quotas  are  still the  driving policy  to information  is  the highest for those  types
instrument for United States sugar producers,  of markets.  It would appear that they would
and  sugar  prices  under  the  1985  Farm  Bill  support  a  policy of lowering  the  loan  rate
have virtually remained unchanged for United  (which was  the case  in the  1985  Farm Bill),
States  producers.  United  States  sugar  users  thus  increasing  the volume  of  trade.  An  in-
want a reduction  of sugar  prices since  sugar  crease in the loan rate would do the opposite.
represents  an input to their production  proc-  It is interesting to read the numerous stud-
ess. However,  certain  key players,  including  ies which have  been  done  on  analyzing  the
many sugar  beet  refineries,  oppose  the  im-  1985  Farm  Bill.  Most  of  the  attention  was
portation of sugar from abroad.  Cooperatives  given to the impact  of the United States gov-
that are involved in both producing and pro-  ernment policies on farmers' income and the
cessing sugar  beets support  protection  from  world  grain  trade.  Essentially,  no  mention
imports since they want high prices for sugar  was  made  about the role  of marketing  insti-
for  their  producers.  However,  a  refinery,  tutions  in international  trade  and  how they
which is involved strictly in the refining proc-  support or do not support aspects of the 1985
ess, clearly wants a large volume of raw sugar  Farm Bill. This is an area which is wide open
regardless of its source; therefore, these types  to research  and part of it would  have to be
of refineries  generally  support free  trade  in  examined within the context of rent seeking
sugar  since,  under  this  regime,  they would  in  international  trade  where  major  players
have  much  more  processing  than  currently  are  discussed,  including  producers,  govern-
is  the case  under  quota  protection.  That  is,  ment  marketing  boards,  and  multinational
they would  prefer to  process  both domesti-  grain  companies.
cally  produced  sugar  and  the  large  volume  In addition, our argument is that marketing
imported from abroad.  In essence,  the sugar  boards  or  state  traders  easily  facilitate  the
beet producers and their integration  through  carrying out of monopsony power on the part
the refining process have a different objective  of  buyers.  For  example,  the  optimal  tariff
in international trade and policy formulation  argument  presented  earlier  is  strengthened
than has a sugar refinery which does not own  when  a  government  or  a  group  of  govern-
any  production  facilities  at  the  farm  level  ments can impose tariffs and have state traders
but, rather, merely refines sugarcane  or sugar  import  the  commodity.  Also,  the  question
beets  regardless  of their  source.  has to be explored  as to the extent to which
importers  can  exert  market  power  because
CONCLUSIONS  of  asymmetric  information.  The  hypothesis
This study has described international  com-  was raised, for example, that the Soviet Union
modity  markets  important  to  southern  agri-  probably has more information about markets
culture.  Some of the markets contain futures  from which they buy than vice  versa.
markets as a price formation mechanism while  In conclusion, cooperation is needed among
others  do  not.  Perhaps,  those  markets  that  major  grain  exporters-not  increased  com-
do  not  contain  futures  are  more  inefficient  petition.  Many  of the  current  marketing  in-
than  those  in which  futures  markets  exist.  stitutions  are  efficient  in terms  of textbook
It is hypothesized  that government  policy  definitions.  However,  in being efficient, they
instruments,  such as the  United States target  create  competition  among  major  exporters.
price  and  loan  rates,  and  the  price-support  To overcome some of the trade barriers,  per-
policy  of  the  European  Community  create  haps less competition and more cooperation
greater  distortions  in  the  international  mar-  would be  desirable.
47REFERENCES
Alaouze,  C.  M.,  A.  S. Watson,  and  N.  H.  Sturgess.  "Oligopoly  Pricing  in the World  Wheat
Market."  Amer. J.  Agr. Econ.,  60,2(1978):  173-85.
Bates,  T.  H.  and A.  Schmitz.  A  Spatial Equilibrium Analysis of the World Sugar Industry
University of California,  Giannini  Foundation Monograph  No. 23;  Berkeley,  California,
1969.
Bredahl,  M.,  A.  Schmitz,  and J.  S. Hillman.  "Rent  Seeking in International Trade:  The  Great
Tomato  War."  Amer. J. Agr. Econ.,  (forthcoming).
Carter, C.  and A.  Schmitz.  "Import Tariffs  and Price  Formation  in the World Wheat Market."
Amer. J.  Agr. Econ.,  61,3(1979):  517-22.
Caves, R. "Organization,  Scale, and Performance  of the Grain Trade."  Food  Research Institute
Studies,  16(1977):  107-23.
Hoff, F.  L. and M. Lawrence.  Implications of World Sugar Markets, Policies, and Production
Costs for U.  S.  Sugar. U. S. Department  of Agriculture,  Economic  Research  Service,
Report  No.  543;  November,  1985.
Leu,  G.  J.  M.,  A.  Schmitz,  and  R.  N.  Knutson.  "Gains  and  Losses  of Sugar  Program  Policy
Options." University of California, Department of Agricultural and Resource Economics,
Working  Paper No.  381;  Berkeley,  California,  1985.
McCalla,  A.  F.  "A  Duopoly  Model  of World  Wheat  Pricing."  J. of Farm Econ.,  48(1966):
711-27.
McCalla,  A.  F.  and  A.  Schmitz.  "Grain  Marketing  Systems:  The  Case  of the  United  States
versus  Canada."  Amer. J.  Agr.  Econ., 61,2(1979a):  200-12.
. "State  Trading  in  Grain."  Paper  presented  to  the  Conference  on  State
Trading  in Industrialized  and Developing  Countries;  Montreal,  Quebec,  Canada; April
19  and 20,  1979b.
Rastegari-Henneberry,  S.  The World Rice Market. University  of California,  Giannini  Foun-
dation Information  Series  No.  85-2;  Davis,  California,  1985.
Sarris,  A.  and  A.  Schmitz.  "Price  Formation  in  International  Agricultural  Trade."  In  A. F.
McCalla and T. Josling (eds.) International  Agricultural  Trade and  Imperfect Markets.
Montclair:  Allanheld,  Osman  & Co.,  1981.
Schmitz, A., A.  F. McCalla,  D. 0.  Mitchell, and C. A. Carter. Grain  Export Cartels. Cambridge:
Ballinger  Publishing  Co.,  1981.
Schmitz,  A.,  R.  S.  Finch,  and  J.  S.  Hillman.  "Agricultural  Export  Dumping:  The  Case  of
Mexican  Winter  Vegetables  in  the  U.  S. Market."  Amer. J.  Agr.  Econ.,  63,4(1981):
645-54.
Siamwalla, A. and S. Haykin. The World Rice Market: Structurej Conduct, and  Performance.
International  Food Policy Research  Institute,  Research  Report  No.  39; June,  1983.
Slayton,  T. M.  "Some  Pieces of the World Rice Puzzle."  Rice Outlook and Situation Report.
U. S. Department  of Agriculture  Economic  Research  Service,  RS-43;  March,  1984.
Stucker,  B.  C. Rice: Backgroundfor 1985 Farm Legislation. U. S. Department of Agriculture
Economic  Research  Service,  Agriculture  Information  Bulletin  No.  470;  September,
1984.
U.  S. Department of Agriculture,  Economic Research  Service.  Cotton: Backgroundfor 1985
Farm Legislation. Agricultural  Information  Bulletin 476;  September,  1984.
U. S. Department  of Agriculture,  Foreign Agricultural  Service.  How U. S.  Cotton is Sold for
Export. Foreign Agricultural  Service  Report  No.  M-198;  December,  1980.
48